(44) Evolutionary psychology

By Onno Hansen-Staszyński | Last Updated: 23 April 2025

In this blog post, I’ll explore a second real-world FIMI approach: evolutionary psychology (the first was the human rights frame – see blog post thirty-nine). After outlining its theoretical underpinnings, I’ll examine how this approach is reflected in real-world policies, and finally assess where it might fall on the Levinas-Hobbes ethical scale (see blog post thirty-eight).

Robert Kurzban

According to evolutionary psychologist Robert Kurzban (see blog posts nine, twelve, and sixteen), the human mind is modular. It is composed of functionally specialized mechanisms that evolved to solve distinct adaptive problems in ancestral environments. These modules operate semi-independently; they are not unified by a central controller and do not necessarily communicate with each other. As a result, different modules may generate inconsistent or even contradictory behavior. Yet this modular architecture does not imply a lack of direction. Each module, in its own domain, contributes to the same ultimate evolutionary goal: increasing the survival and reproduction of one’s genes, often by enhancing social position or supporting kin.

Consequences

Because our modules are fragmented, psychological consistency is an illusion. And because we are not consciously aware of our ultimate evolutionary aims, we do not explicitly strategize to promote our genes. What we do consciously register is a need to improve our social status, maintain alliances, and care for close relations. These are proximate motivations shaped by selection for ultimate genetic fitness; status, reputation, and coalition management are central problems the mind evolved to navigate, even when this comes at the expense of truth, logic, or moral consistency.

Our resulting egoism and inconsistency pose a social risk: if perceived directly, they could lead to us being ostracized, thus destroying our standing in our social group. This is where, according to Kurzban, consciousness comes in. Our consciousness plays a central role not as an executive decision-maker, but as a press secretary: a post hoc rationalizer that generates socially acceptable explanations for our behavior. It guards our reputation, crafting the most favorable, defensible story about our actions, character, and goals.

This means, in Kurzban’s view, that ethics mainly is a social tool: evolved norms for managing reputation. They help individuals signal moral worth and avoid social punishment, rather than expressing timeless truths.

Gad Saad

A second evolutionary psychologist, Gad Saad, points to the limits of our instrumental ethics. According to him, the danger looms in extending our virtue signalling beyond our peer group to include distant or rival out-groups. By stretching moral tools like empathy beyond their evolutionary purposes, we are abandoning our survival instincts and committing what he calls “collective suicide”. He condemns the tendency to treat everyone as kin, and to extend support indiscriminately, as a form of pathological altruism.

Thus, whereas Kurzban tells us more generally that there are boundaries beyond which we no longer need to bother doing good or avoiding the appearance of hypocrisy, Saad identifies one such boundary: empathy for out-groups.

Saad goes a step further. It’s not just that hypocrisy toward out-groups is unnecessary; it is, in his view, potentially dangerous. Members of out-groups are unlikely to reciprocate our empathy—and may even exploit it to harm us. This means, according to Saad, that by extending empathy indiscriminately, we not only erode our societal resilience, but may also empower those who threaten it.

Real-world policies

The evolutionary psychology approach seems to align seamlessly with the policies of President Trump. To start with, he tends to retreat only when his in-group reacts strongly, and that rarely happens. He enjoys a considerable line of credit: his open self-interest is, according to Stephan Lewandowsky, perceived by his supporters as authenticity. Since his supporters value “belief-speaking,” they see Trump as honest, because he does not lie about his motivations. Among these supporters, authentic self-expression outweighs accuracy and factuality. (See: blog post twenty-seven.) In this context, it’s rare for Trump’s actions or statements to become genuinely indefensible within his own camp. While he may appear hypocritical to outsiders, his in-group seldom condemns him. But when they show signs of resistance, he is forced to retreat, as was the case, for instance, when the economic fall-out caused by his tariff rollout threatened to hurt his voters economically. In those cases, he does not admit defeat but spins his retreat as intended all along or simply blames others.

Trump also shows no empathy for his out-groups, whether they are internal “others” like refugees, political opponents, or knowledge workers, or external actors such as geopolitical rivals or even traditional allies. In his view, empathy without reciprocity equals weakness and is a form of suicidal altruism. And since reciprocity is the condition for respect, those who “don’t have the cards” are treated as out-groups, unworthy of support because they cannot repay it. By contrast, the strong, regardless of their moral character, are treated with respect, since they can offer leverage. This helps explain why President Zelenskyy is met with suspicion and ridicule, while President Putin is lauded: one is seen as a weak actor, the other as a powerful one.

Freedom of speech

When applied to disinformation and FIMI, the evolutionary psychology approach takes a egoistical and tribalistic stance. Freedom of speech is framed as a tool for maintaining tribal autonomy and ensuring strategic dominance. The minimum take on freedom of speech is that it applies to me and my group, not to out-groups. If any regulation is to take place, it is to regulate out-group speech.

Cory Doctorow recently summarized this position concerning freedoms and rights in general: “Conservatism consists of exactly one proposition, to wit: There must be in-groups whom the law protectes [sic!] but does not bind, alongside out-groups whom the law binds but does not protect.”

Yarvin, Musk, Vance

Influential individuals linked to President Trump follow the basic features of evolutionary psychology, but each has a slightly different take. Curtis Yarvin, also known as Mencius Moldbug, is an anti-moralist. He envisions a centralized, absolute authority to replace the perceived chaos of liberal democracy. In his view, bureaucratic bloat and universalist empathy are tools exploited by a liberal elite to maintain their dominance. Yarvin’s leader resembles a CEO whose responsibility is towards their submitted stockholders (in-group), not outsiders.

Elon Musk uses moral terms opportunistically, seemingly aligning with Kurzban’s hypocrisy as a strategy. His interpretation of free speech seems personal: his reflex is to retaliate when attacked or mocked. J.D. Vance uses a clear moral language and promotes traditional values such as family, religion, and national identity. He acts as a referee, condemning deviations from the moral perspective and softness towards liberal institutions, which he sees as out-group institutions.

Criticism

In the case of Trump, Yarvin, Musk, and Vance, it is not always clear what their in-groups are. In Trump’s rhetoric, he defines his base of working-class, often white voters, as his in-group deserving of his protection. Yarvin approaches the concept of in-group mainly theoretically and coldly. Musk has a narrower stance and restricts his in-group to those involved in his missions and ventures. His empathy for a broader group of like-minded individuals seems rather utilitarian, that is, inclusion in his in-group as long as it serves his goals. Vance aligns with Trump in defining his American working-class base as his in-group, supported by his personal narrative as the defender of “forgotten” America.

Critics like Robert Reich believe that Trump’s and Vance’s inclusion of American workers is instrumental only. According to them, their core in-group consists of themselves and a few oligarchs only. This would imply that in-groups are not given but rather, just as ethics, a strategic tool to fend off claims of egoism and avoid being ostracized.

The Levinas-Hobbes scale

I’ll now place the most prominent real-world representatives of the evolutionary psychology approach on the Levinas-Hobbes ethical scale (see: blog post thirty-eight). Regarding out-groups, the approach is full-on Hobbesian: universal empathy is rejected, while self-preservation remains central.

When it comes to their own in-group, the picture is more diverse. Yarvin aligns fully with Hobbes; for him, empathy is a weakness. Musk is likewise near the Hobbesian pole: his ethical stance is utilitarian: people belong to the in-group only insofar as they serve a goal. His reasoning is system-level, and he shows little sign of Levinasian responsibility.

Trump mimics Levinasian care for his chosen in-group but rarely enacts it meaningfully. Vance, by contrast, weaves a moral undertone into his narratives. He is less performative than Trump, though still entangled in political utility. Regarding his in-group, he may be placed between Trump and Levinas, perhaps just to the Levinas side of center: there is a stronger suggestion of sincere ethical responsibility, even if ambition remains part of the equation.

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